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through its only means of action, the same individual. In finding that
the defendant corporation did not act, the Circuit Court relied on the
forms utilized. Each step was considered without reference to its relation to the object or purpose of the entire transaction. This approach
to tax problems, first adopted in Isham v. United States,9 has received
some recent supportl 0 and has the questionable merit of certainty not
dependent upon the exercise of judicial discretion, the function of courts
being reduced to that of checking forms and labels. A necessary result
of the adoption of this approach to tax litigation is the extension of the
sphere of permissive avoidance.
Discovery of the realities of the transaction is the announced goal
of the advocates of both approaches, but they would travel different
paths."
One would follow form; the other, substance. That the
latter approach was adopted in the Court Holding Co. case seems obvious.
Taxation of the corporation under this doctrine is not inevitable, but
the determination in the Court Holding Co. case that the corporation
had acted was not a finding of fact, but rather the decision of the
case after considering the law and the policy applicable. 12 By treating
it as a finding of fact and basing a distinction thereon, the court in the
principal case has, in effect, rejected the doctrine of Commissioner v.
Court Holding Co.
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HOMESTEAD: CONVEYANCE BY ONE SPOUSE JOINED BY
HIMSELF AS ATTORNEY IN FACT FOR THE OTHER SPOUSE
Knowlton v. Dean, 31 So.2d 58 (Fla. 1947)
The plaintiff and her husband owned their homestead as tenants by the
entirety. The husband gave plaintiff a power of attorney which by its
terms expressly allowed her to dispose of all his interest in the homestead. The husband then disappeared and did not return. Plaintiff and
917 Wall. 496 (U. S. 1873).
"0Magill, Sales of Corporate Stock or Assets, 47 COL. L. REv. 707 (1947).
"'See Louisville Trust Co. v. Glenn, 65 F. Supp. 193, 198 (W. D. Ky. 1946).
"See Guinness v. United States, 73 F. Supp. 119 (Ct. Cl. 1947).
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her daughter moved out of the home and rented it. Two months later
plaintiff on behalf of herself and her husband entered into a contract to sell
the property to the defendants, who later refused to perform. Plaintiff
asked for and was awarded a decree for specific performance. On defendants' appeal, HELD, that the homestead had been abandoned. Decree
affirmed.
Once a homestead has been abandoned, it is no longer subject to the
restrictions placed upon alienation of homesteads. 1 Plaintiff, having shown
an abandonment by her husband and by herself, was clearly able, using the
power of attorney, to execute a deed to property owned by herself and her
husband as tenants by thq entirety. 2 Since the court found an abandonment, it left undecided the question of whether one spouse may convey
homestead land held by the .entirety with a deed joined in by himself as
attorney in fact for the other spouse. This question is dealt with in the
following discussion.
The few reported decisions of other jurisdictions under homestead
provisions similar to those in effect in Florida indicate that, where one
spouse owns the entire estate, neither can convey a homestead by a deed
joined in by himself as attorney in fact for the other under a general 8 or
special 4 power of attorney. Where there is a special power, however, one
jurisdiction, taking a more liberal view, has held effective a deed executed
in this manner provided that the power was jointly executed, and acknowl-

edged by the wife. 5
Even if the Florida Court, when presented with this problem, rejects
the liberal view permitting alienation under a specific power, a distinction
might be made between a homestead owned by one spouse and a homestead owned by the entirety. When the homestead is held by the entirety,
the entire estate passes on the death of one spouse to the survivor by operation of law with no restrictions against alienation; 6 the children have no
1
Miller v. West Palm Beach Atlantic Nat. Bank, 142 Fla. 22, 194 So. 230 (1940);
Lanier v. Lanier; 95 Fla. 522, 116 So. 867 (1928).
2
FLA. STAT. 1941, §708.09 (Supp. 1945).
'Gagliardo v. Dumont, 54 Cal. 496 (1880); Wallace v. Travelers Insurance Co.,
54 Kan. 442, 38 Pac. 489 (1894). Contra: Oregon Mortgage Co. v. Hersner, 14 Wash.
515, 45 Pac. 40 (1896) under WAs. GEN. STAT. 51446.
'Keeline v. Clark, 132 Iowa 360, 106 N. W. 257 (1906).
5
Jones v. Robbin, 74 Tex. 615, 12 S. W. 824 (1889); Warren v. Jones, 69 Tex.

462, 6 S. W. 775 (1888).
'Menendez v. Rodriguez, 106 Fla. 214, 143 So. 223 (1932).
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inheritable interest 7 such as they have when one spouse owns the entire
estate in the homestead. 8 Therefore, some of the reasons usually given
for restricting alienation of homesteads (the protection of the widow and
children 9 and the general protection of the home' 0 ) lose their importance
when the homestead is held by the entirety.
Consideration, however, must be given to the fact that, although held
by the entirety, the property is still a home, and the members of the family have an interest in its preservation. Moreover, there is no case either
making or rejecting a distinction for purposes of alienation between a
homestead owned by one spouse and a homestead owned by the entirety;
and it is quite possible that the Florida Court would not find the distinction persuasive enough to warrant a relaxation of the profective restrictions
on alienation. The words of the Florida Statutes may be of some aid.
They provide that a spouse may, using a power of attorney from the other
spouse, execute a deed to property held by the entirety," but immediately
following this provision there is a general caveat' 2 that this law 13 shall not
be construed as dispensing with the joinder of husband and wife in conveying homestead property. No exception is made for a homestead
owned by the entirety, and the language is sufficiently broad to cover all
homesteads without regard for the manner in which they are held. While
the caveat refers to joinder and not physical joinder there is, nevertheless,
a possible inference arising from the language that if the estate is a
homestead, no matter how held, joinder by power of attorney in an instrument of alienation would be insufficient.
GEORGE 0.

PRINGLE

'Ibid.
8

Fta. STAT. 1941, §§731.05(1) and 731.27 (Supp. 1945).
594 (1908).
"Jones v. Carpenter, 90 Fla. 407, 106 So. 127 (1925).
"FL& STAT. 1941, §708.09 (Supp. 1945).

'Thomas v. Craft, 55 Fla. 842, 46 So.

"FtA. STAT. 1941, §708.10(5)
1SFLA.

(Supp. 1945).

STAT. 1941, §§708.08 and 709.09 (Supp. 1945).
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